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Responsiveness, If You Can Afford It:  
Policy Responsiveness in Good and Bad Economic Times 
 
Abstract. Traditional theories of representation posit that political parties have incentives to 
respond to public opinion which, in turn, is reflected in public policy as parties come together 
to form governments. Absent from this chain of representation, however, is the notion of 
costs.  We advance the study of policy responsiveness by arguing that the government’s cost 
of responding to the electorate is marginal under conditions of strong economic growth but 
considerable during hard economic times. Cross-national analyses of voters and government 
welfare policies produces results that are consistent with this expectation. The findings imply 
that democratic performance, expressed as responsiveness, is conditional on economic 
growth.  
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Representative democracy means that voters choose leaders to represent them in substan-
tive terms. On this point, the weight of the evidence from industrialized democracies finds 
that elected representatives and the governments they form are responsive to the public’s 
preferences (Budge et al. 2012; Erikson et al. 2002; Kang and Powell 2010; Soroka and 
Wlezien 2010; but see Achen and Bartels 2016).  But while models of government respon-
siveness necessarily emphasize the influence of public sentiment, policy and performance 
outcomes in contemporary democracies are, of course, shaped by a range of factors. Some 
studies examine how responsive government bears on policy outcomes like taxes, interest 
rates, social spending, or pension reform (e.g., Häusermann 2010; Kang and Powell 2010; 
Budge et al. 2012). Delving deeper, researchers identify the circumstances shaping these ar-
rangements, including whether the opinion-policy link varies according to electoral systems, 
power-sharing arrangements, and federalism (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Peters 2016).  
The common refrain running through these studies is that the degree to which elite-
crafted policy reflects mass sentiment depends on the larger institutional environment. Cer-
tain institutional arrangements facilitate policy responsiveness, and others slow, blunt, or 
otherwise impede it.  Missing from previous studies on the impact of institutional arrange-
ments, however, is something even more basic to politics: the notion of costs. Students of 
public opinion have long recognized that citizens balance the benefits of government action 
(for, say better health care) against the costs incurred (higher taxes).  And recently, motivated 
by the fall-out of the 2008 financial crisis, the political parties research has considered how 
the economic situation influences party behavior.
1
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 Recent studies examine the effects of economic crises on party behavior. Traber, Giger, and 
Häusermann (forthcoming) argue that while voters care about the economy in times of crisis, 
(governing) parties wish to downplay the issue – thus producing a salience gap between polit-
ical elites and voters.  Clements, Nanou, and Real-Dato (2018) find that (governing) parties 
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In this article we argue that the responsiveness of policy to public opinion is not inevita-
ble but instead depends on costs, as conscribed by the health of the nation’s economy. From 
this systematic consideration of costs follows an important new expectation: Governments 
are more responsive to public preferences when the economy is performing well and less 
when it is not. We evaluate this simple but untested claim using data on government welfare 
state spending, median voter preferences, and the performance of the economy across four-
teen developed democracies from 1978 to 2010, a period that spans a wide range of economic 
experiences. Encouragingly, we find in the main that governments in these western democra-
cies deliver policy in response to shifts in voter preferences. Yet this responsiveness is 
stronger in magnitude under robust economic conditions. Conversely, anemic economies 
suppress government responsiveness to public opinion.  
Explaining Government Policy Choices: Two Research Traditions 
What explains government policy decisions?  Two literatures address this question: re-
search on policy responsiveness, and research on the political economy of the welfare state.  
The former asserts that government policy choices are informed by the preferences of the 
electorate and emphasizes the importance of the chain of representation linking citizens to 
policy outcomes. This chain begins with voters selecting parties to represent their interests.  
Parties-in-parliaments then come together to form a government.  Conflicts among factions 
and parties must then be overcome to advance a coherent set of policy objectives.  Finally, 
the government implements its objectives in the form of concrete policy solutions that reflect 
                                                                                                                                                        
are less responsive to voters relative to the preferences of market elites. From a different per-
spective, analyses performed by Abou-Chadi and Kayser (2017) suggest that voters demand 
less during periods of economic decline. These studies are different than ours in that they 
focus on issue salience, party position-taking behavior (as opposed to policies), or are limited 
to the crisis years.  
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citizens’ preferences.  The responsiveness of policy makers to the median voter thus risks 
derailment at numerous points along this multistage process.  Research on party responsive-
ness has explored the contexts in which the transmission from citizen preferences to policy 
outputs is facilitated or impeded (Kang and Powell 2010; Soroka and Wlezien 2010).  Fur-
ther, governments may not tend equally to all voters’ preferences but favor some subconstit-
uencies over others (Griffin and Newman 2005; Rosset, Giger, and Bernauer 2013); nor is 
responsiveness constant across issues (Rasmussen, Reher, and Toshkov forthcoming).  These 
caveats aside, the basic conclusion is that responsiveness to the median voter works.  
The literature on the political economy of the welfare state emphasizes a different and 
wider set of factors to understand the bases of government policy.  A venerable tradition 
argues that government partisanship along with the power of labor provides a parsimonious 
account of policy outcomes (Stephens 1979). Others take a more institutional approach and 
assert that policy outcomes vary according to long-standing relationships among businesses, 
financial institutions, workers, and governments (Hall and Soskice 2000).  Still another 
strand of this research highlights how the organization of the macro-economy puts pressure 
on governments to compensate those adversely affected by globalization, deindustrialization, 
and other changes associated with advanced capitalism (Iversen and Cusack 2000).   
The policy responsiveness and political economy literatures, then, provide very different 
accounts of government policy decisions.  The former highlights how party incentives facili-
tate responsiveness to the median voter; the latter emphasizes how capitalism’s structural 
factors limit the government’s options and assigns little independent role to voters or their 
party representatives.
2
  This matters for how we understand policy change. The first tradition 
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 An exception is Brooks and Manza’s (2007) work on how cross-national differences in the 
size of welfare states are shaped by differences in the opinions of national electorates. How-
ever, while Brooks and Manza examine public opinion-spending linkages, they do not con-
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implies that policy change is a consequence of changing voter preferences; the latter tradition 
predicts change to be more evolutionary in nature and dependent on constraints.  Of utmost 
importance for our contribution, the parties scholarship downgrades (if not ignores) the po-
tential costs of policy responsiveness, while the comparative welfare state literature empha-
sizes structural constraints, or costs, with voters left to the side.  We combine insights from 
these contributions by recognizing that economic downturns reduce public revenues, raising 
policymakers’ pressures to return to acceptable levels of economic growth while stymying 
their capacity to respond to voter preferences.
3
  This generates the following hypothesis: gov-
ernment policy responsiveness to public opinion is stronger when economic conditions are 
robust and weaker during lean economic times. 
Measures and Data 
We evaluate this claim by examining the determinants of government policy.  Data on our 
key measures are available on an annual basis from 1978 to 2010 for fourteen developed de-
mocracies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Testing our hypothesis re-
quires measures for three central concepts: policy outcomes, public opinion, and economic 
conditions.  In the set of Western democracies we analyse, social welfare is the most salient 
dimension of policy contestation.
4
  Accordingly, our dependent variable is measured using 
the social welfare generosity index developed by Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto (2017). This in-
                                                                                                                                                        
sider responsiveness per se (in terms of shifts in spending) nor do they consider variations in 
the welfare state-public opinion nexus across good and bad economic times.   
3
 The supplementary information file extends this theoretical discussion in terms of govern-
ment’s valence and positional considerations in good and bad economic times. 
4
 Analyses of party policy positions in Western Europe find that the tax-spend dimension 
ranks highest in terms of importance (Benoit and Laver 2006, esp. p. 176 and appendix). 
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dex, Welfare state generosity, is comprised of a broad range of social insurance benefits in-
cluding employment insurance, sick pay insurance, and public pensions.
5
 While an annual 
measure of public preferences for social welfare would be ideal for our purposes, such 
measures do not exist cross-nationally. Accordingly, for Median voter position on policy 
preferences we rely on the left-right scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right).  We use surveys from the 
Eurobarometer series to calculate the median positions for each country-year. We note that 
several scholars have analyzed the relationship between redistributive attitudes and Left-
Right self-placements, and they report strong estimates of this relationship (Alesina and Giu-
liano 2009; Benoit and Laver 2006). Our third variable of interest, Economic growth, is 
measured in real terms using data provided in Armingeon et al. (2017). 
6
 
We use a general baseline specification to assess the direct influences of public opinion 
and the economy on policy outcomes and then move to assess whether the economy condi-
tions the effects of public opinion.  Given our annual data, we specify a model which allows 
the analyst to uncover both the immediate and long-run impact of a shock to X on Y.  To do 
so, we specify an error correction model (ECM) of the form ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽0∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
                                                 
5
 The index is the sum of the sub-indices for unemployment and sick pay insurance and pen-
sion generosity. Country-year values are based on z-scores for all available observations for 
each characteristic. Proponents of this measure argue that it is a better measure of govern-
ment policy than social welfare spending because the latter is influenced by unemployment 
rates and the population of pensioners that cause welfare spending to vary even if entitlement 
policies remain the same. 
6
 Real economic growth accounts for inflation. We also control for membership in the Euro-
pean Monetary Union and for the size of the labor force (Armingeon et al. 2017; Visser 
2015). The supplementary information file reports the robustness of our results over time 
trends, debt levels, current account balances, and for a set of political institutions.  
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𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, where ∆ is the difference operator, t indexes time (in years), and i countries.  
Modeling shifts in policy outcomes rather than levels helps address potential issues of non-
random error structures (Tromborg 2014). The contemporaneous impact of a shock to X is 
provided by 𝛽0 while the cumulative impact is 𝛽1/𝛼1 (De Boef and Keele 2008).
7
  To address 
serial correlation and to allow for inter-panel differences in the dynamic processes we esti-
mate AR(1) terms. Finally, we include country fixed effects to account for unmeasured 
sources of country-level heterogeneity and panel-corrected standard errors to address hetero-
scedasticity.  
 Model 1 of Table 1 reports regression estimates. In this model, our chief interest is in the 
influence of Median voter position on Welfare state generosity.  A negative coefficient im-
plies responsiveness: if the median voter is moving rightward and increasing in value, this 
suggests that welfare state generosity should decrease.  Model 1 shows that the coefficient on 
Median voter position is statistically significant over the long-run.  The coefficient on the 
long run effect for the lagged Median voter position variable is precisely estimated negative 
0.35.  This result of general responsiveness to public opinion shifts is consistent with previ-
ous research (e.g., Budge et al. 2012; Kang and Powell 2010; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). In 
particular, the results that support longer-term effects, as opposed to more immediate effects, 
are consistent with research arguing there are significant lags in time between changes in 
public opinion and subsequent changes in policy outcomes (Budge et al. 2012).   
Model 2 includes the interaction Median voter positiont-1 × Economic growtht-1 to assess 
whether this effect of public opinion on welfare state generosity differs across levels of 
growth.  Recall that we expect responsiveness to be greater—that is, the negative influence of 
Median voter position on Welfare state generosity to be larger—when the economy is grow-
                                                 
7
 Research on ECMs argues that the order of integration must be consistent across variables 
(Grant and Lebo 2016).  For our case, our series are stationary, or balanced with I(0). 
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ing at a healthy rate. The negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that growth 
rates increase the impact of public opinion on government policy.  
Using Model 2 estimates, we illustrate the conditioning influence of the economy on re-
sponsiveness in two ways.  Figure 1A presents the marginal effects for the long-term across 
the sample range of values for growth.  We see that responsiveness occurs only when growth 
is sufficiently high (approximately 1%). Figure 1B provides a dynamic representation of this 
effect.  The figure displays a forecast of the change in Welfare state generosity when the me-
dian voter position shifts one standard deviation to the left (see SI file for details).  As we 
would expect, a leftward opinion shift increases welfare generosity when growth rates are at 
or above the sample median of 2.5% per annum.  But when the economy is stagnant, posi-
tions of the median voter register no effect on policy. 
[Table 1 and Figure 1 here] 
Conclusion 
A consensus has emerged in the cross-national research that the quality of democratic 
representation is influenced by (largely time invariant) political institutions.  Our study sheds 
light on something more fundamental to democratic performance: the notion of costs. Com-
bining insights from studies of party competition and from the political economy of the wel-
fare state, we argue that the government’s responsiveness to the public depends on economic 
conditions. We find that governments in Western democracies are generally responsive to 
shifts in public opinion.  Yet when growth rates fall below one percent per annum, estimates 
of long-run policy responsiveness become statistically indistinguishable from zero.  This 
finding suggests that economic growth and government responsiveness operate in tandem. 
And if countries’ economies are as interconnected as some argue, then one would expect 
economic waves of expansion and depression to produce corresponding “waves” of demo-
cratic responsiveness. We conclude there exists a minimum threshold of growth that is neces-
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sary for systematic government policy responsiveness.  If the degree of economic volatility 
experienced during the Great Recession returns, we can expect that governments will find the 
costs of responding to public demands higher than they can bear.  Future research should 
extend these analyses to examine whether what we uncover for welfare policy in general per-
sists for specific policy areas such as immigration and the environment. 
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Table 1. Analyses of Changes in Welfare State Generosity 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Welfare state generosityt-1 -0.099*** (0.015) -0.098*** (0.015) 
ΔMedian voter positiont -0.162 (0.171) -0.133 (0.170) 
Median voter positiont-1 -0.347*** (0.111) -0.165 (0.130) 
ΔEconomic growtht  0.014 (0.010) 0.013 (0.010) 
Economic growtht-1 0.023** (0.010) 0.305** (0.143) 
ΔMedian voter positiont × ΔEconomic growtht   -0.081 (0.094) 
Median voter positiont-1 × Economic growtht-1   -0.053** (0.027) 
ΔLabor forcet 0.052 (0.059) 0.053 (0.058) 
Labor forcet-1 -0.059*** (0.015) -0.053*** (0.016) 
EMU membershipt 0.343*** (0.059) 0.333*** (0.059) 
Constant 5.183*** (0.816) 4.187*** (0.923) 
R
2
 0.15  0.15  
Notes. Entries show estimated coefficients, with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.The 
dependent variable is Welfare state generosityt.  Country dummies are included and omitted from 
table.  Number of observations = 367, Number of countries = 14,*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10  
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Figure 1. Government Responsiveness in Good and Bad Times 
 
A. Marginal Effect of Median Voter Position on Welfare State Generosity as Eco-
nomic Growth varies 
 
B. Forecast of Effect of Leftward Shift in Median Voter Position on Welfare State 
Generosity for High, Average, and Zero Rates of Economic Growth 
 
Figures produced with Table 1 Model 2 estimates. Figure 1A charts the coefficient on Median voter positiont-1 
over values of Economic growtht-1. Negative estimates in Figure 1A indicate stronger government responsive-
ness to public opinion. Dashed lines report 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Figure 1B displays forecasted expected values of Welfare state generosity when the Median voter position is 
one standard deviation to the left of its in-sample mean, calculated under three different growth scenarios. Initial 
value for Welfare state generosity is 34. Vertical bars report 95% confidence intervals. Simulations are per-
formed with “dynsim” (Williams and Whitten 2011). 
 
